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Article 9

CORPORATE CRIME. By MarshallB. Clinard& Peter C Yeager. New

York: The Free Press. 1980. Pp. xiii, 386.
Reviewed by HowardM. Friedman*
Despite Ralph Nader's characterization on the dust jacket, Corporate Crime is not "a call to action." Rather, it is an encyclopedia of
the expanding research by sociologists and criminologists on corporate deviance. The work is the outgrowth of a 1979 empirical study
conducted by the authors and their associates of governmental actions against the 477 largest publicly held U.S. manufacturing corporations.I Corporate Crime reflects the growing consensus that "white
collar crime" is an undescriptive label in need of refinement.2 The
book's focus upon the unique characteristics of organizational deviance present in corporate actions provides that refinement.
The authors seek to identify the causes of corporate crime. As
Clinard and Yeager point out, traditional explanations are inadequate: "[T]he argument that poverty or individual pathology
'causes' crime, for example, fails completely to account for lawbreaking by corporate executives, who are affluent and, presumably, welladjusted persons" (p. 21). The authors therefore seek other explanations. The reasons for illegal conduct which they explore fall into
two categories: (1) economic pressures which encourage attempts to
maximize profits by ignoring the rules of the game; and (2) organizational structures which numb the moral sensitivity of corporate officials and create corporate allegiances that outweigh devotion to legal
rules.
The authors' 1979 empirical study tested the validity of economic models as predictors of illegal behavior. The data suggested
only a moderate correlation between financial considerations and illegal activity (pp. 127-132).3 The authors conclude that "a more satisfactory explanation is that economic pressures and other factors
operate in a corporate environment that is conducive to unethical
and illegal practices" (p. 132).4 The corporate environment which
*
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they describe consists of a structure that diffuses responsibility and a
management policy that encourages loyalty to the corporate enterprise by monopolizing the executive's time and interrupting ties to
non-corporate centers of values.
Corporate Crime raises many difficult questions. The first relates
to the data developed by the authors. What counts as corporate
crime? Beginning with Edwin Sutherland's seminal work, 5 researchers have generally treated some kinds of conduct punishable by noncriminal sanctions as white collar crime. Thus, Clinard and Yeager
include in their data not only criminal prosecutions but also all instances of governmental enforcement through administrative orders,
civil penalties and injunctions. This expanded definition of "crime"
is crucial to some of the classical Marxian premises underlying early
studies of white collar crime. According to Marxian theory, it is the
political power of white collar violators that keeps certain antisocial
activities from being subjected to criminal sanctions (p. 75).
This class-based, Marxian analysis has fallen upon hard times in
recent literature. 6 Yet it seems apt in analyzing government interaction with the largest national and multinational businesses. Clinard
and Yeager waffle on this one. They make what appears to be an
obligatory, but explicit, disavowal of "radical or Marxist thinkers"
who fail to recognize "that even the largest corporations are increasingly being subjected to severer restrictions, heavier penalties, and
stronger governmental control.

.

." (p. 75). This seems inconsistent

with an earlier section on the political influence of corporations
which concludes that "so great is corporate power that it is inconceivable, except in time of war, that government could have the power to
achieve true corporate accountability for the national welfare" (p.
57).
The interaction of corporate constituencies with government
policymakers is perhaps the most interesting dynamic which sociologists could study. Clinard and Yeager catalogue much of the current
knowledge about that interaction, but continue in the tradition that
considers the interaction an obstacle to government's proper performance of its duties. A more helpful approach would view corporate influence as part, but only part, of the process by which values in
a democracy are mediated into law. A weakness in Clinard and Yeager's work is the failure to concede that the current attitude toward
E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
See, e.g., A. Reiss, Jr. & A. Biderman, supra note 2, at 39; P. HOROSZOWSKI, ECONOMIC
SPECIAL-OPPORTUNITY CONDUCT AND CRIME 1-7 (1980).
5
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corporate crime may reflect not systemic imperfections but a continually shifting accommodation of divergent values. Pro-corporate notions may be held, for example, not only by shareholders and
management, but also by those who are employed by large enterprises or those who fear increased unemployment or other economic
disruption from anti-business policies.
The category of corporate crime on which the book focuses has
certain unique characteristics. Its impact is spread among large
numbers of victims, each of whom suffers only small individual loss.
Moreover, even its diffused victims are often unidentifiable by the
perpetrator at the time of the criminal activity. Specific victims of
water pollution, price fixing, or hazardous products can generally not
be named in advance. These characteristics lessen societal concern
with corporate crime. However, Clinard and Yeager, like most other
researchers in this field, make assumptions about the moral repugnancy of corporate crime. They rely primarily on a single 1978 national survey which explored attitudes toward the seriousness of
various types of crimes (p. 5).
What counts as white collar crime is complicated by other notions. The private influence which prevents government from
criminalizing certain conduct also inhibits it from subjecting other
sorts of white collar deviance even to civil or administrative sanctions. They quote the late Senator Philip Hart on this phenomenon:
"It's not uncommon to find some corporation that appears to be determinably breaking the law, only to discover when you get up close
that, technically, the firm has merely succeeded in being unethical"
(p. 213). Clinard and Yeager concede that "often, only a thin line
separates. . . an unethical tactic from an actual violation of law" (p.
213). They fail to point out, however, that the line is often the result
of a carefully, or not so carefully, conducted cost-benefit analysis.
Where victims are unidentifiable at the time of making the relevant
decision, society is often willing to balance the cost of extra protection against the aggregate loss to be suffered by unknown persons. It
is an odd quirk of ethics that while, for example, society will spare no
cost to rescue identifiable broken bodies from a collapsed building, it
will make judgments about the cost of stricter building standards
that would marginally decrease the likelihood that a building will
collapse on presently unknown occupants. Indeed, much federal
7
agency rulemaking is subject to a required cost-benefit analysis.
One need not be an apologist for business interests to suggest the
7
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difficulty of determining whether a balance of costs and benefits
should consciously be made in particular situations. Whether society
so values particular goals that no explicit balancing of countervailing
interests is justified is a determination which calls for the judgment of
the political and judicial branches of government. For example, the
United States Supreme Court recently held that Congress had rejected any cost-benefit test in authorizing OSHA to promulgate occupational health standards dealing with toxic materials and
harmful physical agents. The majority held that "Congress understood that the Act would create substantial costs for employers, yet
intended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe and
healthful working environment.""
The ultimate task of our legal system is to wrestle with the problem of translating values into law. When is there a societal consensus
that certain goals should be imposed by law? When must achieving
those goals be tempered by consideration of other societal interests?
If conflicting interests result in the legal imposition of specific requirements when they are cost-effective, is it immoral for business
enterprises to accept this cost-benefit determination?
Clinard and Yeager focus, in separate chapters, on three particular kinds of corporate deviance-anticompetitive behavior, dissemination of inaccurate financial statements, and questionable corporate
payments. While these are presumably singled out as prime examples of "corporate crime," in fact few other areas pose so many
problems in determining the appropriate balance between competing national values and interests. In an increasingly internationalized economy, the wisdom of those national antitrust laws which
impede international competition by local industry becomes more
problematic than in the past. The wisdom of making independent
certified public accountants insurers of the accuracy of financial
statements which they audit is far from clear. Most strikingly, both
the wisdom and the morality of rules against corporate political contributions and corporate payments to obtain foreign business have
been called into question. A closer examination of the questionable
payments area illustrates the difficult issues involved.
The authors describe corporate contributions to candidates'
election campaigns as having a "long and sordid history" of corrupting the democratic processes of government (p. 157). Yet there
610 (Supp. 1981) and statutes discussed in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S.
Ct. 2478, 2491 (1981).
8 101 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
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are countervailing interests. In 1978, the Supreme Court struck
down as a violation of the first amendment a state statute that limited corporate expenditures in referendum campaigns on issues unrelated to corporate economic interests:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest
that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of
speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual. The inherent worth of speech . . . does not
depend upon the identity of its source. .... 9

The Supreme Court pointed out that contributions to candidates,
rather than referendum campaigns, pose concerns about corruption
through the creation of political debts and thus may well be subject
to regulation. '0 But the point is that there are trade-offs-a lessening
of political dialogue in exchange for prophylactic regulation.
In the area of foreign payments, the ambiguities are even
greater. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) permits
"grease payments" to ministerial or clerical employees of foreign governments in order to expedite the performance of their duties. The
FPCA prohibits only payments to influence such discretionary official action as the passage of legislation and the awarding of contracts." The moral distinctions between "grease payments" and
prohibited bribes is unclear. Indeed, Congress based its distinction
not on moral differences but on the pragmatic necessity of making
"grease payments" in order to do business abroad effectively. 12
More recently, both the General Accounting Office' 3 and the

United States Chamber of Commerce' 4 have suggested that current
antibribery restrictions may have resulted in the loss of substantial
amounts of foreign business by American companies. Legislation has
been proposed which would loosen these provisions by eliminating
the prohibition on payments to sales agents merely because there is
9 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
10 i'd at 777.
11 See H. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT 121-25 (1981).
12 Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1977).
13

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO CONGRESS, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 13-17 (1981).
14 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, The Jrice of Ambiguily: More Than Three Years Under the
Foreign Cornupt PratlicesAct (1981), discussed in 609 SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) A-15 (June 24,
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"reason to know" that they will pass funds on as bribes.1 5 Even a
high official within the SEC recognized that there is a question as to
whether or not the FCPA's antibribery provisions reflect such funda6
mental values of our society that they are worth the cost.'
These kinds of balancing and compromises do not make for
gripping scenarios of criminal intrigue. But they do more accurately
reflect the reality of interactions between private business and government. The recognition of this reality appears from time to time in
Clinard and Yeager's book, often only to be swept aside by broad
introductory and conclusory paragraphs which suggest more simplistic views of desirable government policymaking.
Finally, mention must be made of the role of government enforcement activities in any analysis of corporate crime. Clinard and
Yeager deal with the enforcement role of regulatory agencies and
with the need for the imposition of more severe sanctions. But more
importantly, all their data on the incidence of corporate crime relates
only to the incidence of enforcement actions of some sort (pp. 11113). They deal at length with the oil, automobile and pharmaceutical industries as those that "appear to violate government regulations
and laws more frequently than others" (p. 237). In fact, their data
supports only the conclusion that more enforcement actions are
brought against companies in these industries. Additional research is
required to determine whether these industries are prime examples of
those whose environments are conducive to unlawful behavior, or
whether the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration and the Food and Drug Administration merely have particularly zealous enforcement staffs.
Despite these reservations, Corporate Cn'me is a valuable contribution to the literature on white collar crime. It is generally a balanced
and thoughtful work. As a ready source of reference for the complex
and difficult issues surrounding analysis of the incidence, causes and
cures for corporate crime, it is excellent. The book is a compact but
comprehensive introduction to the behavioral and legal issues involved, a starting point for much additional serious research, and a
15 Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, S. 708, 97th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sen. Chafee). See also H.R. 2530, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981).
16 Address by Commissioner Stephen J. Friedman, discassed in Friedman Evaluates Chafee
ProposalTo AmendFCPA. Emphasizes Common Groundwith SECPoliy Statement, 601 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) D- 1 (Apr. 19, 1981). But see Statement by former Chairman Harold M. Williams, discussed in Multinationals: Former SEC ChairmanEndorses SEC Recommendations on FCPA,
367 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (Intl. Trade Rep.) (BNA) A-I (July 28, 1981).
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handbook for the person wishing to be well informed on a vital issue
of contemporary policy concern.

